Quotes from Machiavelli

These are the quotations taken from Machiavelli’s works, used in this book. I used the public domain versions of his books for most of my sources, however some of the wording and punctuation may be updated or altered for clarity and modernity. See the Bibliography for details on sources.

In the book, quotations from The Prince are shown entirely in bold.

“The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, the rest are his servants. He divides his kingdom into provinces and sends out different administrators, changing them as he chooses. But the King of France is at the centre of a long-established order of nobles, who are acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them. These lords have their own prerogatives, and the can the king only take these away at his peril.”

“He who considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it.”

“The lords that remain make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity.”

“One can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one always finds malcontents who desire a change. Such men… can open the way into the state and render the victory easy…”

“You meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you have crushed.”

“It is impossible to hold with such tranquility states organized like France. That was why frequent rebellions rose against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities in these states. While the memory of those principalities endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession.”

“…nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness.”

“The nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; but the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles. From these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three outcomes: a principality, self-government, or anarchy.”

“The nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to unite to support of one of their own, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadow they can gratify their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist the nobles, also promote one of their own, and make him a prince so as to be protected by his authority.”

“He who obtains his position by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he who is raised to it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them as he wishes.”

“One cannot satisfy the nobles by fair dealing, without injury to others, but you can satisfy the people, for their intention is more honest than that of the nobles. The latter wish to oppress the people, whilst the people only want not to be oppressed.”

“A prince can never protect himself from a hostile people, because there are too many of them. But he can secure himself from the nobles, as they are few in number.”

“The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him. The nobles have more foresight and cunning. They always act in time to save themselves, and to seek favours from him whom they expect to win.”

“A prince… can do well without the same nobles, since he can make and unmake them at will, and to give or take away their authority when it pleases him.”

“The nobles ought to be looked at mainly in two ways: they either commit themselves entirely to your fortune, or they hold back. Those who commit themselves, and are not greedy, ought to be honoured and loved. Those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through cowardice and fear, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially of those who give sensible advice. In good times they bring you honour, and in times of adversity, you won’t have to fear them.”

“But when for their own ambitious ends they deliberately shun committing themselves and remain independent, it is a sign that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you.”

“A prince must safeguard himself against them, and to fear them as if they were declared enemies, because in adverse times they will always be out to ruin him.”

“One who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do, seeing they only ask not to be oppressed by him.”

“But he who becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, in opposition to the people, ought, above everything, to seek to win the people over to himself. He may easily do this if he becomes their protector.”

“When men receive good from someone they were expecting evil from, they feel more obligated to their benefactor. The people quickly become more supportive to their benefactor than if he had been raised to power by their favours… I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adverse times.”

“A prince who has built his power on the people, one who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail to take precautions, and who wins the people’s allegiance by his resolution and energy, he will never find himself let down by them, and it will be shown that he has secured his foundations well.”

“These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the civil government to absolute rule, for such princes either rule personally or through appointees. In the latter case, their government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those citizens who have been put in office. These, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance. The prince has not the time amid tumults to establish his authority, because the citizens and subjects are accustomed to receive orders from officials. They are not of a mind to obey him in adverse times. The prince will always find in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom the prince can trust.”

“Such a prince cannot rely upon what he has experienced in quiet times, when citizens had need of the state, because then everyone agrees with him. When death is far distant, they all promise they will to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, there are few to be found. And this test of loyalty is all the more dangerous, because it can only be made once.”

“A wise prince must devise ways by which his citizens will always have need for the state and for him in every circumstance. Then he will always find them faithful.”

“The first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you.”

“In truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them.”

“He who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it always cries the watch-word of liberty and rallies around its former privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits from the new ruler will ever cause it to forget.”

“And whatever you may do or provide against, they never forget that name or their former privileges unless they are disunited or dispersed but at every chance they immediately rally to them…”

“In republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there himself.”

“So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them. “